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Abstract
Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a (smaller)
set of best or most suitable alternatives from which a final winner will be chosen.
Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards or in recommender
systems to display featured objects. In this paper, we analyze shortlisting methods
that are based on approval data, a common type of preferences. Furthermore, we
assume that the size of the shortlist, i.e., the number of best or most suitable alter-
natives, is not fixed but determined by the shortlisting method. We axiomatically
analyze established and new shortlisting methods and complement this analysis
with an experimental evaluation based on biased voters and noisy quality esti-
mates. Our results lead to recommendations which shortlisting methods to use,
depending on the desired properties.
1 Introduction
Shortlisting is a task that arises in many scenarios and applications: given a large set
of alternatives, identify a smaller subset that consists of the best or most suitable al-
ternatives. Prototypical examples of shortlisting are awards, where we often find a
two-stage process. In a first shortlisting step, the large number of contestants (books,
films, individuals, etc.) is reduced to a smaller number. In a second step, the remaining
contestants can be evaluated more closely and one contestant in the smaller set is chosen
to receive the award. Both steps may involve a form of group decision making (voting),
but can also consist of a one-person or even automatic decision. For example, the short-
list of the Booker Prize is selected by a small jury [25], whereas the shortlists of the
Hugo Awards are compiled based on thousands of ballots [24]. Another very common
application of shortlisting is the selection of a number of most promising applicants for
a position who will be invited for an interview [3,23]. Apart from these prototypical ex-
amples, shortlisting is also useful in many less obvious applications like the aggregation
of expert opinions for example in the medical domain [14] or in risk management and
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assessment [26]. Shortlisting can even be used in scenarios without agents in the tradi-
tional sense, for example if we consider features as voters to perform an initial screening
of objects, i.e., a feature approves all objects that exhibit this feature [13].
In this paper, we consider shortlisting as a form of collective decision making. We
assume that a group of voters announce their preferences by specifying which alternatives
they individually view worthy of being shortlisted, i.e., they file approval ballots. In
practice, approval ballots are commonly used for shortlisting, because the high number
of alternatives that necessitates shortlisting in the first place precludes the use of ranked
ballots. Furthermore, we assume that the number of alternatives to be shortlisted is
not fixed (but there might be a preferred number), as there are very few shortlisting
scenarios where there is a strong justification for an exact size of the shortlist. Due to
this assumption, we are not in the classical setting of multiwinner voting [12,18], where
a fixed-size committee is selected but in the more general setting of multiwinner voting
with a variable number of winners [13, 16, 17]. One can also view shortlisting rules as
a particular type of social dichotomy functions [6, 9], i.e., voting rules which partition
alternatives into two groups.
In real-world shortlisting tasks, there are two prevalent methods in use: Multiwin-
ner Approval Voting (selecting the k alternatives with the highest approval score) and
threshold rules (selecting all alternatives approved by more than a fixed percentage of
voters). Further shortlisting methods have been proposed in the literature [5, 13, 17].
Despite the prevalence of shortlisting applications, there does not exist work on system-
atically choosing a suitable shortlisting method. Such a recommendation would have
to consider both expected (average-case) behavior and guaranteed axiomatic properties,
neither have been studied previously (with the exception of numerical simulations on the
average size of shortlists [13]). Our goal is to answer this need and provide principled
recommendations for shortlisting rules, depending on the properties that are desirable
in the specific shortlisting process.
In more detail, the contributions of this paper are the following:
• We define shortlisting as a voting scenario and specify minimal requirements for
shortlisting methods (Section 2). Furthermore, we introduce three new shortlisting
methods: First k-Gap, Largest Gap, and Size Priority (Section 3).
• We conduct an axiomatic analysis of seven shortlisting methods and by that iden-
tify essential differences between these methods. Furthermore, we axiomatically
characterize Approval Voting, f -Threshold rules, and the new First k-Gap rule
(Section 4).
• We present a connection between shortlisting and clustering algorithms, as used
in machine learning for classifying objects. We show that First k-Gap and Largest
Gap can be viewed as instantiations of linkage-based clustering algorithms and
introduce further shortlisting methods based on other algorithms. We also ax-
iomatically analyze these clustering-based methods (Section 5).
• In numerical simulations, we approach two essential difficulties of shortlisting pro-
cesses: biased voters and voters with imperfect (noisy) perception of the alter-
natives. These simulations complement our axiomatic analysis by highlighting
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further properties of shortlisting methods and provide further data points for rec-
ommending shortlisting methods (Section 6). An open-source implementation of
all considered shortlisting rules as well as for the numerical experiments is avail-
able [19].
• Our recommendations are summarized in Section 7. In brief, our analysis leads to a
recommendation of First k-Gap, f -Threshold , and Size Priority , depending on the
general shortlisting goal and desired behavior. As Size Priority can be viewed as an
improved form of Multiwinner Approval Voting (as it avoids arbitrary tiebreaking),
our recommendations include the most popular choices for shortlisting but with
First k-Gap also a new shortlisting method.
2 The Formal Model
In this section we describe our formal model that embeds score-based shortlisting in a
voting framework. The model consists of two parts: a general framework for approval-
based elections with a variable number of winners [13, 16, 17] on the one hand and, on
the other hand, four basic axioms that we consider essential prerequisites for shortlisting
rules.
An approval-based election E = (C, V ) consists of a non-empty set of alternatives
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and an n-tuple of approval ballots V = (v1, . . . , vn) where vi ⊆ C and
cj ∈ vi if voter i approves alternative cj and cj 6∈ vi otherwise. In the following we
will always write nE for the number of voters and mE for the number alternatives in an
election E. If no ambiguity arises, we will omit the subscript. The approval score scE(cj)
of alternative cj in election E is the number of approvals of cj in V , i.e., scE(cj) = |{i :
1 ≤ i ≤ n and cj ∈ vi}|. We write sc(E) for the vector (scE(c1), . . . , scE(cm)). To
avoid unnecessary case distinctions, we only consider non-degenerate elections: these
are elections where not all alternatives have the same approval score. An approval-based
variable multiwinner rule (which we refer to just as “voting rule”) is a function mapping
an election E = (C, V ) to a subset of C. Given a rule R and an election E, R(E) ⊆ C
is the winner set according to voting rule R, i.e., R(E) is the set of alternatives which
have been shortlisted. Note that R(E) may be empty.
Now we introduce the basic axioms that we require every shortlisting rule to satisfy.
Anonymity and Neutrality are two basic fairness axioms that are in general considered
to be essential for voting rules [27].
Axiom 1 (Anonymity). All voters are treated equal, i.e., for every permutation pi :
{1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} and every election E = (C, V ), if E∗ = (C, V ∗) with V ∗ =
(vpi(1), . . . , vpi(n)), then R(E) = R(E∗).
Axiom 2 (Neutrality). All alternatives are treated equally, i.e., for every election E =
(C, V ) and permutation pi : C → C, if E∗ = (C, V ∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v∗n)) with v∗i = {pi(c) | c ∈
vi}, then pi(c) ∈ R(E∗) iff c ∈ R(E) for all c ∈ C.
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Shortlisting differs from other multiwinner scenarios in that we are not interested
in representative or proportional committees. Instead, the goal is to select the most
excellent alternatives. This goal is formalized in the following axiom.
Axiom 3 (Efficiency). No winner can be (strictly) less approved than a non-winner,
i.e., if scE(ci) > scE(cj) and cj ∈ R(E) then also ci ∈ R(E).
The assumption that approval scores are approximate measures of the general qual-
ity of alternatives can also be argued in a probabilistic framework: under reasonable
assumptions a set of alternatives with the highest approval scores coincides with the
maximum likelihood estimate of the truly best alternatives [20]. Thus, we impose Effi-
ciency to guarantee the inclusion of the most-likely best alternatives.
Since the number of winners is variable in our setting, there is generally no need to
break ties. Because tiebreaking is usually an arbitrary and unfair process, voting rules
should not introduce unnecessary tiebreaking.
Axiom 4 (Non-tiebreaking). If two alternatives have the same approval score, either
both or neither should be winners i.e., if scE(cj) = scE(ck) then either cj, ck ∈ R(E) or
cj, ck 6∈ R(E).
We set these four axioms as the minimal requirements for a voting rule to be con-
sidered a shortlisting rule in our sense.
Definition 1. An approval-based variable multiwinner rule is a shortlisting rule if it
satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality, Efficiency and is non-tiebreaking.
Observe that Non-tiebreaking and Efficiency are axioms that are only interesting if
we consider voting with a variable number of winners. Clearly, no voting rule for voting
with a fixed number of winners can be Non-tiebreaking. Furthermore, except for the
issue of how to break ties, there is exactly one voting rule for approval voting with a
fixed number k of winners that satisfies Efficiency, namely picking the k alternatives
with maximum approval score (Multiwinner Approval Voting).
A consequence of Efficiency is that the challenge in defining a shortlisting rule is not
to find the winners but to decide how many winners there should be. This reduces the
complexity of finding the winner set drastically as there are only linearly many possible
winner sets, in contrast to the exponentially many subsets of C.
Observation 1. For every election there are at most m+ 1 sets that can be winner sets
under a shortlisting rule.
3 Voting Rules
In the following we define the shortlisting rules that we study in this paper. We define
these rules by specifying which properties an alternative has to satisfy to be contained in
the winner sets. As before, let E = (C, V ) be an election. We assume additionally that
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c1, . . . , cm is an enumeration of the alternatives such that scE(ci−1) ≥ scE(ci). Some of
the following rules are parameterized by a positive integer k.
A natural idea is to select all most-approved alternatives. The corresponding winner
set equals the set of co-winners of classical Approval Voting [4].
Approval Voting. An alternative c is a winner if and only if c’s approval score is
maximal, i.e., c ∈ R(E) if and only if scE(c) = max(sc(E)).
Another natural way to determine the winner set is to fix some percentage threshold
and declaring all alternatives to be winners that surpass this approval threshold [16].
For example, for a baseball player to be entered into the Hall of Fame, more than 75%
of the members of the Baseball Writers’ Association of America have to approve this
nomination [8]. Such rules are known as quota rules in judgment aggregation [11].
f-Threshold. Let f : N → N be a function such that 0 < f(|V |) < |V |. Then,
c ∈ R(E) for an alternative c ∈ C if and only if scE(c) > f(|V |). We write α-Threshold
for a constant 0 < α ≤ 1 to denote the f -Threshold rule with f(n) = bα · nc.
The next two rules are further shortlisting methods that have been proposed in the
literature. First Majority [17] includes as many alternatives as necessary to comprise
more than half of all approvals. The following definition deviates slightly from the
original definition in that it is non-tiebreaking.
First Majority. Let i be the smallest index such that∑
j≥i
scE(cj) >
∑
j<i
scE(cj).
Then c ∈ R(E) if and only if scE(c) ≥ scE(ci).
Next-k [5] is a rule that includes alternatives starting with the highest approval
score, until a major drop in the approval scores is encountered, more precisely, if the
total approval score of the next k alternatives is less than the score of the previous
alternative.
Next-k. ci ∈ R(E) if for all i′ < i it holds that scE(ci′) ≤
∑k
j=1 scE(ci′+j), where
scE(ci′+j) = 0 if i
′ + j > m.
Observe that for both Next-k and First Majority the winner set does not depend
on the chosen enumeration of alternatives. This will also hold for the new voting rules
introduced in the following. Similarly to Next-k, the next two rules are based on the
idea that one wants to make the cut between winners and non-winners in a place where
there is a large gap in the approval scores. This can either be the overall largest gap or
the first sufficiently large gap.
Largest Gap. Let i be the smallest index such that scE(ci)−sc(ci+1) = maxj<m(scE(cj)−
scE(cj+1)). Then c ∈ R(E) if and only if scE(c) ≥ scE(ci).
Note that in this definition a smallest index is guaranteed to exist due to our as-
sumption that profiles are non-degenerate.
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First k-Gap. Let i be the smallest index such that scE(ci) − scE(ci+1) ≥ k. Then
c ∈ R(E) if and only if scE(c) ≥ scE(ci). If no such index exists, then R(E) = C.
The parameter k has to capture what it means in a given shortlisting scenario that
there is a sufficiently large gap between alternatives, which in particular depends on
|V |. If no further information is available, one can choose k by a simple probabilistic
argument. Assume, for example, alternative c’s approval score is binomially distributed
scE(c) ∼ B(n, qc), where n is the number of voters and qc can be seen as c’s quality.
We choose k such that the probability of events of the following type are smaller than a
selected threshold α: two alternatives a and b have the same objective quality (qa = qb)
but have a difference in their approval scores of k or more. In such a case, the First
k-Gap rule might choose one alternative and not the other even though they are equally
qualified, which is an undesirable outcome. For example, if n = 100 and we want
α = 0.5, we have to choose k ≥ 5 and if we want α = 0.1 we need k ≥ 12. Note that this
argument leads to rather large k-values; if further assumptions about the distribution of
voters can be made, smaller k-values are feasible.
The voting rules above output winner sets of very different sizes (as we will see in
the experimental evaluation, Section 6). It is a common case, however, that there is a
preferred size for the winner set, but this size can be varied in order to avoid tiebreaking.
This flexibility is especially crucial if the electorate is small and ties are more frequent.
We propose a rule that deals with this scenario by accepting a preference order over set
sizes as parameter and selecting a winner set with the most preferred size that does not
require tiebreaking.
Size Priority. Let B be a strict total order on 0, . . . ,m, the priority order. Then
R(E) = {ci ∈ C | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} iff
• either scE(ck) 6= scE(ck+1) or k = 0 or k = m,
• and scE(c`) = scE(c`+1) for all ` B k.
As mentioned before, Size Priority is a non-tiebreaking analogue of Multiwinner
Approval Voting , which selects the k alternatives with the highest approval score. Size
Priority is used by the Hugo Award with the priority order 5 B 6 B 7 . . . [24]. Generally,
the choice of a priority order depends on the situation at hand. For award-shortlisting,
typically a small number of alternatives is selected (the Booker Prize, e.g., has a shortlist
of size 6). In a much more principled fashion, Amegashie [2] argues that the optimal
size of the winner set for shortlisting should be proportional to
√
m, i.e., the square root
of the number of alternatives.
In practice, the most common priority order is k B k + 1 B · · · B m for some
k < m, i.e., the smallest non-tiebreaking committee that contains at least k alternatives
is selected. Therefore, we give Size Priority rules based on such a priority order a special
name.
Increasing Size Priority. Let B be a strict total order on 0, . . . ,m and let k be a
positive integer with k ≤ m such that k B k + 1 B · · · B m and m B ` for all ` < k.
Then, the Size Priority rule defined by the priority order B is an Increasing Size Priority
rule.
6
Another important special case are instances of Size Priority that rank 0 and m
the lowest, i.e., that avoid being indecisive whenever possible. We call Size Priority
instances with this property decisive.
Decisive Size Priority. Let B be a strict total order on 0, . . . ,m such that k B m
and k B 0 holds for all 0 < k < m. Then, the Size Priority rule defined by the priority
order B is an Decisive Size Priority rule.
Other special cases of Size Priority could be defined in a similar way, for example
Decreasing Size Priority. However, Increasing Size Priority and Decisive Size Priority
are the most natural and common types of Size Priority and additionally satisfies better
axiomatic properties than, e.g., Decreasing Size Priority.
Example. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with 8 alternatives c1, . . . , c8 and 10 voters.
Furthermore, let sc(E) = (10, 10, 9, 8, 6, 3, 3, 0). Then the set of Approval Voting winners
is {c1, c2} and the set of 0.5-Threshold winners is {c1, . . . , c5}. For every i ≤ 7 we have
scE(ci−1) ≤ scE(ci) + scE(ci+1). Therefore, the set of Next-k winners is {c1, . . . , c7} for
every k ≥ 2. The set of First Majority winners is {c1, c2, c3}, since
∑
c∈C scE(c) = 49
and scE(c1) + scE(c2) + scE(c3) = 29. The first 2-gap is between c4 and c5, hence the
winner set according to First 2-Gap is {c1, . . . , c4}. There are two 3-gaps, between c5
and c6 and between c7 and c8 and there are no larger gaps, hence {c1, . . . , c5} is the set
of winners under Largest Gap. Now let B be a strict total order 1 B 6 B 0 B . . . . Then
the set of Size Priority winners under B is the empty set, as {c1} and {c1, . . . , c6} break
ties.
Finally, we observe that Approval Voting is a special case of First k-Gap, Next-k and
Increasing Size Priority. First k-Gap and Next-k equal Approval Voting if we set k = 1
and Increasing Size Priority equals Approval Voting with priority order 1 B 2 B · · · B
m B 0.
4 Axiomatic Analysis
In this section, we axiomatically analyze shortlisting rules with the goal to discern their
defining properties. First, we consider axioms and properties that are motivated by
the specific requirements of shortlisting, then we study well-known axioms that describe
more generally desirable properties of voting rules. For an overview, see Table 1.
When shortlisting is used for the initial screening of a set of alternatives, for example
for an award or a job interview, then we do not assume that the voters have perfect
judgment. Otherwise, there would be no need for a second round of deliberation, as we
could just choose the highest-scoring alternative as a winner. Therefore, small differences
in approval may not correctly reflect which alternative is more deserving of a spot on the
shortlist. Thus, out of fairness, we want our voting rule to treat alternatives differently
only if there is a significant difference in approval between them.
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Approval Voting 3 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 3
f -Threshold 3 3 3 3 × × × 3 3 ×
First Majority 3 3 × × × 3 3 × × ×
Next-k 3 3 × × × × 3 × 3 ×
Largest Gap 3 3 × × × 3 3 3 3 ×
First k-Gap 3 × × 3 ` ≤ k p ≥ k 3 3 3 3
Decis. Size Priority 3 3 × × × 3 3 × 3 ×
Incr. Size Priority 3 × × 3 × × 3 × 3 3
2-Means Clustering 3 3 × × × 3 3 × 3 ×
Table 1: Results of the axiomatic analysis. For Size Priority , axioms marked with ∗
are satisfied for all priority orders of the form · · ·B 0Bm and · · ·BmB 0 (due to our
assumption of non-degenerate profiles).
Axiom 5 (`-Stability). If the approval scores of two alternatives differ by less than `,
either both or neither should be a winner, i.e., |scE(cj) − scE(ck)| < ` implies either
cj, ck ∈ R(E) or cj, ck 6∈ R(E).
Here, the parameter ` has to capture what a significant difference is in a given
election. This will depend, for example, on the number and trustworthiness of the
voters.
We observe that 1-Stability equals non-tiebreaking. Furthermore, as the approval
scores approximate the underlying quality of alternatives1, at the very least we want
to include alternatives that are approved by everyone and exclude alternatives that are
approved by no one.
Axiom 6 (Unanimity). If an alternative is approved by everyone, it must be a winner,
i.e., scE(c) = n implies c ∈ R(E).
Axiom 7 (Anti-Unanimity). If an alternative is approved by no one, it cannot win, i.e.,
scE(c) = 0 implies c 6∈ R(E).
Unfortunately, it turns out that these three axioms are incompatible in general.
Proposition 1. No voting rule satisfies Unanimity, Anti-Unanimity and `-Stability for
l ≥ 1.
1The relation between approval voting and maximum likelihood estimation is analyzed in detail by
Procaccia and Shah [20], in particular, under which conditions approval voting selects the most likely
“best” alternatives.
8
Proof. Consider the election E = (C = {c1, c2}, V = ({c1})). Then any voting rule that
satisfies `-Stability for l ≥ 1 must satisfy R(E) ∈ {{c1, c2}, ∅}. By Unanimity, R(E)
must be {c1, c2}. However, then c2 ∈ R(E) which contradicts Anti-Unanimity.
Observe that Proposition 1 does not hold if there are many more voters than alterna-
tives. Indeed Unanimity, Anti-Unanimity and `-Stability can be jointly satisfied if and
only if |V | ≥ l · |C|+ 1.
Theorem 2. For every ` there is a rule that satisfies Unanimity, Anti-Unanimity and
`-Stability for every election E such that nE > (`− 1) · (mE − 1). This is a tight bound
in the following sense: If ` > 1, no voting rule satisfies Unanimity, Anti-Unanimity and
`-Stability for all elections E with nE ≤ (`− 1) · (mE − 1).
Proof. For the one direction, we claim that a slightly modified version of First k-Gap
satisfies all three axioms for elections E with nE > (`−1) · (mE−1). We define Modified
First `-Gap as follows: Let c1, . . . , cm be an enumeration of C such that scE(ci−1) ≥
scE(ci). Let i be the smallest index such that scE(ci)− scE(ci+1) ≥ `. Then c ∈ R(E)
if and only if scE(c) ≥ scE(ci). If no such index exists, then R(E) = ∅ if there is an
alternative c with scE(c) = 0 , and R(E) = C otherwise. Clearly, this rule still satisfies
`-Stability.
Now, let E be an election such that there is an alternative c with scE(c) = n.
Assume first that there is no alternative c′ with scE(c′) = 0. In that case, Modified First
`-Gap vacuously satisfies Anti-Unanimity and, by definition of Modified First `-Gap, also
Unanimity. Now assume that there is an alternative c with scE(c) = 0. We claim that
there is an index i such that scE(ci)− scE(ci+1) > ` and hence only alternatives c such
that scE(c) ≥ scE(ci) > ` are winners. Otherwise, we have scE(ci+1) ≥ scE(ci)−` for all
i ≤ m and hence scE(cm) ≥ scE(c1)− ` · (m− 1). However, as scE(c1) = n > ` · (m− 1)
this contradicts the assumption that there is an alternative c with scE(cj) = 0.
Finally, let E be an election such that there is no alternative c with scE(c) = m.
Then, Modified First `-Gap vacuously satisfies Unanimity. Now, if there is an alternative
c′ with scE(c′) = 0 then we have to distinguish two cases. If there is no `-gap, then
R(E) = ∅ by definition and hence Modified First `-Gap satisfies Anti-Unanimity. On
the other hand, if there is a `-gap, then only alternatives above the `-gap are select,
which must have a score of ` or larger. Hence, Anti-Unanimity is also satisfied.
Now we assume towards a contradiction that there is a rule R that satisfies Una-
nimity, Anti-Unanimity and `-Stability (` > 1) for all elections E = (C, V ) with
nE = (` − 1) · (mE − 1). Let E be an election with 2 alternatives and ` − 1 voters
such that score(E) = (`− 1, 0). We observe nE = `− 1 ≥ (`− 1) · (2− 1). Therefore, R
must satisfy Unanimity, Anti-Unanimity and `-Stability on E. This means c1 ∈ R(E)
must hold by Unanimity. Then scE(c1)− scE(c2) < ` implies c2 ∈ R(E) by `-Stability,
which contradicts Anti-Unanimity.
First k-Gap satisfies Unanimity and `-Stability for k ≥ ` for all elections. Therefore,
it cannot satisfy Anti-Unanimity. Furthermore, we observe that First k-Gap is the only
voting rule considered in this paper that satisfies `-Stability for ` > 1, as Approval
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Voting, f -Threshold, Next-k, First Majority and Largest Gap satisfy Unanimity and
Anti-Unanimity for all non-degenerate profiles. Size Priority always satisfies either
Unanimity or Anti-Unanimity. In particular it satisfies Unanimity if m B 0 holds and
Anti-Unanimity if 0 B m holds. It satisfies both axioms for (non-degenerate profiles)
if and only if it is decisive. Therefore Increasing Size Priority satisfies Unanimity, but
not Anti-Unanimity. Finally, Size Priority satisfies `-Stability for ` > 1 if and only if 0
or m is the most preferred size. It is worth noting, however, that Largest Gap satisfies
`-Stability whenever there is an `-gap.
While we do not want to exclude promising alternatives, we also do not want all
alternatives to be shortlisted. As we have seen above, this is unavoidable if we want to
satisfy `-Stability and there are no significant differences between the alternatives. The
following axiom formulates the idea that—at least—we do not want all alternatives to
be winners if there is a significant difference in scores between the alternatives.
Axiom 8 (p-Decisiveness). Let p ≥ 1 be an integer. We say that a voting rule R is
p-decisive if the following holds for every election E: If scE(cj−1) ≥ scE(cj) + p for any
j ≤ m, then R(E) 6= C.
Note that `-Stability and p-Decisiveness are compatible if and only if p ≥ `. First
k-Gap exactly matches this bound: it satisfies p-Decisiveness for p ≥ k and `-Stability
for ` ≤ k. Therefore, it can be seen as an optimal compromise for an k-stable rule.
Largest Gap, Approval Voting and First Majority can never select the least-approved
alternative for non-degenerate profiles. Therefore, they satisfy p-Decisiveness for any
p ≥ 1. In contrast, Next-k (for k > 1) and f -Threshold do not satisfy p-Decisiveness
for any fixed p ≥ 1. Consider an election E with score sc(E) = (3p + 1, 2p, 2p). Then
scE(c1) > scE(c2) + p but under Next-k (for k > 1), 0.5-Threshold and (Increasing)
Size Priority with 2 B 3 B . . . we have R(E) = {c1, c2}. Finally, Size Priority satisfies
p-Decisiveness if and only if it is either decisive or 0 B m.
Another requirement for a shortlisting rule is that it produces short shortlists. To
find voting rules that produce small sets of winners without compromising on quality,
we define the concept of a minimal voting rule that satisfies a set of axioms.
Definition 2. Let A be a set of axioms and let S(A) be the set of all voting rules
satisfying all axioms in A. Then, we say a voting rule is the minimal voting rule R for
A if for all elections E it holds that R(E) = ⋂R∗∈S(A)R∗(E).
In a general voting framework, we could not assume that the minimal voting rule R
for a set of axioms A satisfies all axioms in A. However, in shortlisting this is always
the case.
Observation 2. Let A be a set of axioms that contains the four basic shortlisting
axioms (Axioms 1–4). Furthermore, let R be the minimal voting rule for A. Then R
satisfies all axioms in A.
Proof. Let E be an election. We distinguish two cases. Assume first that there is
a rule R∗ in S(A) such that R∗(E) = ∅. Then, by definition R(E) = ∅ = R∗(E).
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Now assume there is no rule R∗ in S(A) such that R∗(E) = ∅. Then, as every rule
in S(A) is a shortlisting rule, there is a kR∗ ≤ m for every rule R∗ ∈ S(A) such that
R∗(E) = {c1, . . . , ckR∗}. Now let km be the smallest k such that there is a ruleR∗ ∈ S(A)
with R∗(E) = {c1, . . . , ck}. Then, by definition R(E) = R∗(E). Therefore, for every
election E there is a rule R∗E ∈ S(A) such that R(E) = R∗E(E). This implies that R
satisfies all axioms in A.
The minimal shortlisting rule (satisfying Axioms 1–4) is the voting rule that always
outputs the empty set. If we demand that our voting rule always selects at least one win-
ner, then Approval Voting is the minimal shortlisting rule and the minimal shortlisting
rule that is k-stable is First k-Gap.
Axiom 9 (Determined). Every election must have at least one winner, i.e., for all
elections E we have R(E) 6= ∅.
We observe that besides f -Threshold and Size Priority all voting rules considered in
this paper are determined. Size Priority is determined if and only if it is either decisive
or m B 0.
Theorem 3. Approval Voting is the minimal voting rule that is efficient, non-tiebreaking
and determined. Furthermore, for every positive integer k, First k-Gap is the minimal
voting rule that is efficient, k-stable and determined.
Proof. LetR be Approval Voting. Furthermore, letA be the set {Efficiency,Non-tiebreaking,
Determined}. Approval Voting is efficient, non-tiebreaking and determined, therefore we
know ⋂
R∗∈S(A)
R∗(E) ⊆ R(E).
Now, every determined voting rule must have a non-empty set of winners. If the vot-
ing rule is efficient, the set of winners must contain at least one top ranked alternative.
Finally, if the voting rule is non-tiebreaking, the winner set containing one top ranked al-
ternative must contain all top ranked alternatives. Let W ∈ R∗(E) where R∗ is efficient,
non-tiebreaking and determined. Then, c ∈ W for all c with scE(c) = maxj≤m(scE(cj)).
Such c’s define exactly the winner set according to Approval Voting and thus
R(E) ⊆
⋂
R∗∈S(A)
R∗(E).
Let R be First k-Gap and A the set {Efficiency, k − Stability,Determined}. We
know that First k-Gap is efficient, k-stable and determined, therefore we know⋂
R∗∈S(A)
R∗(E) ⊆ R(E).
As above, the winner set of every determined and efficient voting rule must contain
at least one top ranked alternative. Now, consider an enumeration of the alternatives
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c1, . . . , cm such that scE(cj) ≥ scE(cj+1) holds for all j. If a voting rule is k-stable,
a winner set containing one top ranked alternative must contain all alternatives ci for
which scE(cj) < scE(cj+1) + k holds for all j < i. By the definition of First k-Gap this
implies
R(E) ⊆
⋂
R∗∈S(A)
R∗(E).
This result is another strong indication that First k-Gap is promising from an ax-
iomatic standpoint. It produces shortlists that are as short as possible without violating
k-Stability, an axiom that is very desirable in many shortlisting scenarios.
Both `-Stability and p-Decisiveness formalize the idea that the winner determination
should take the magnitude of difference between approval scores into account. This
contradicts an idea that is often considered in judgment aggregation, namely that all al-
ternatives should be treated independently [11]. This idea is formulated as the following
independence axiom.
Axiom 10 (Independence). If an alternative is approved by exactly the same voters
in two elections then it must be a winner either in both or in neither. That is, for an
alternative c, and two elections E = (C, V ) and E∗ = (C, V ∗) with |V | = |V ∗| and c ∈ vi
iff c ∈ v∗i for all i ≤ n, it holds that c ∈ R(E) iff c ∈ R(E∗).
The only voting rules that satisfy Independence in our paper are f -Threshold rules.
Indeed, Independence characterizes f -Threshold rules.
Theorem 4. Given a fixed set of alternatives C, every shortlisting rule that satisfies
Independence is an f -Threshold rule for some function f .
Proof. Let R be a voting rule that satisfies Anonymity and Independence. Then we
claim that for two elections E = (C, V ) and E∗ = (C, V ∗) with |V | = |V ∗| and an
alternative ci ∈ C we have that scE(ci) = scE∗(ci) implies that either ci ∈ R(E),R(E∗)
or ci 6∈ R(E),R(E∗). If scE(ci) = scE∗(ci), then there is a permutation pi : {1, . . . , n} →
{1, . . . , n} such that ci ∈ vi if and only if ci ∈ v∗pi(i). Now, let E ′ = (C, pi(V )). Then, by
Anonymity, ci ∈ R(E) if and only if ci ∈ R(E ′). Now, as ci is approved by the same
voters in E ′ and E∗, Independence implies ci ∈ R(E ′) if and only if ci ∈ R(E∗).
Now let R additionally satisfy Efficiency. Let E = (C, V ) and E∗ = (C, V ∗) be two
elections with |V | = |V ∗|. Furthermore, assume ci ∈ R(E) and scE(ci) < scE∗(ci). We
claim that this implies ci ∈ R(E∗). By Independence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that there
is an alternative cj such that scE(cj) = scoreE∗(ci). Then, by efficiency, cj ∈ R(E∗).
Now, let E ′ be the same election as E but with ci and cj switched. Then by Neutrality
we have ci ∈ R(E ′). As by definition scE′(ci) = scE∗(ci) this implies ci ∈ R(E∗) by
Anonymity and Independence. This means that for every alternative ci and n ∈ N there
is a k such that for all elections E = (C, V ) with |V | = n we know ci ∈ R(E) if and only
if scE(ci) ≥ k. If R also satisfies Neutrality, then k must be the same for every ci ∈ C
and hence R must be a Threshold rule.
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A sensible modification of f -Threshold would be to select all alternatives with an
above-average approval score, i.e., the set of winners consists of all alternatives c with
scE(c) >
1
m
·∑c′∈C scE(c′). Duddy, Piggins and Zwicker [10] analyzed this rule and
concluded that it is the best rule for partitioning alternatives into homogeneous groups
(see also the axiomatic characterization of this rule by Brandl and Peters [6]). This rule
is not a f -Threshold rule (by definition) and it does not satisfy Independence.
Let us now consider two classic axiom of social choice theory, adapted to the short-
listing setting.
Axiom 11. (Independence of Losing Alternatives) Let E = (C, V ) with V = (v1, . . . , vn)
and E∗ = (C \ {c∗}, V ∗) with V ∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v∗n) be two elections such that c∗ 6∈ R(E)
and v∗i = vi \ {c∗} for all i ≤ n. Then R(E) = R(E∗).
Clearly, f -Threshold satisfies this axiom as it also satisfies Independence. Further-
more, as the removal of a losing alternative can only widen the gap between the winners
and the non-winners, First k-Gap satisfies the axiom, and so does Approval Voting ,
which is a special case of First k-Gap. None of the other rules satisfy Independence of
Losing Alternatives. First Majority does not satisfy the axiom: Assume E is an election,
such that sc(E) = (3, 2, 1, 0). Then the winning set under First Majority is {c1, c2} but
removing c3 changes the winning set to {c1}. For the same election, the winner set under
Largest Gap is {c1} but removing c3 changes this to {c1, c2}. For Next-k, consider an
election E with (E) = (4, 3, 2, 0). Then, for every k > 1, we have R(E) = {c1, c2} under
Next-k, but after deleting c3 we have R(E) = {c1}.
For Size Priority we encounter a difficulty: Independence of Losing Alternatives
cannot be applied to Size Priority because each instance of Size Priority is defined
by a linear order on 0, . . . ,m and decreasing the number of alternatives necessitates
a different order. However, we can say that a linear order B on N defines a class of
Size Priority instances as follows: for every number of alternatives m, we define a Size
Priority instance by restriction B to {0, 1, . . . ,m}. This allows us to precisely say what
it means that a class of Size Priority instances (defined by B) satisfies Independence
of Losing Alternatives. Consider, e.g., the class of Size Priority instances defined by
any order of the form 2 B 1 B . . . and an election E with sc(E) = (2, 1, 1). Then
R(E) = {c1} but the removal of c3 leads to R(E) = {c1, c2}. Thus, Size Priority fails
Independence of Losing Alternatives in general. Moreover, we say that a priority order
B defines a class of Increasing Size Priority instances whenever k B k + 1 B k + 2 B
· · · B k − 1 B k − 2 B · · · B 1 B 0 for some k. With this definition, removing a losing
alternative cannot change the outcome of a Increasing Size Priority rule, as the rule
selects the smallest non-tiebreaking winner set with at least k alternatives; if k ≤ m
then it selects all m alternatives (no losing alternatives exist).
In many shortlisting scenarios, for example in the context of recommender systems,
it is not always clear if alternatives should be bundled together. For example, if we
want to select a number of books to recommend, should we include each part of a
trilogy separately or bundle the whole series? Shortlisting rules that satisfy Resistance
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to Clones are useful because the outcome of the rule is the same in both cases (if all
parts of the series are equally popular).
Axiom 12 (Resistance to Clones). Adding a clone of an alternative to an election does
not change the outcome, i.e., if E = (C, V ) and E∗ = (C∪{c∗}, V ∗) are two elections with
|V | = |V ∗| such that ci ∈ vj if and only if ci ∈ v∗j for all ci ∈ C and c∗ ∈ v∗j if and only
if ck ∈ vj for some k ≤ m, then R(E) = R(E∗) if c 6∈ R(E) and R(E∗) = R(E) ∪ {c∗}
if c ∈ R(E).
Clearly, Independence implies Resistance to Clones. Hence, f -Threshold satisfies
Resistance to Clones. Furthermore, cloning has no effect on gaps, hence Largest Gap
and First k-Gap satisfy Resistance to Clones. So does Approval Voting which is a special
case of First k-Gap. For First Majority and Next-k it can be helpful for an alternative
to be cloned. For example, consider an election with scE = (3, 2, 0). Then the set of
First Majority winners would be {c1} but after cloning c2, the set of First Majority
winners is {c1, c2, c′2} where c′2 is the clone of c2. Similarly let scE = (2, 1, 0). Then
the set of Next-k winners for every k ≥ 2 would be {c1}. If we clone c2, Next-k selects
{c1, c2, c′2} where c′2 is the clone of c2. Finally, for Size Priority we again need to consider
families of Size Priority instances. For some classes, cloning can harm an alternative.
For example, consider 2 B 3 B . . . and scE = (2, 1, 0). Then the set of Size Priority
winners is {c1, c2}, but if we clone c1, then c2 is not a winner any more. This also shows
that Increasing Size Priority is not resistant to clones.
Finally, we study two version of another axiom that is very common for example
in judgment aggregation, namely Monotonicity. Monotonicity intuitively demands that
increasing the support for an alternative cannot hurt this alternative. We first consider
a variation that is tailored to the shortlisting setting, stating that if a voter that did not
approve the winning alternatives changes his mind and approves all winners, then this
can not change the outcome of an election.
Axiom 13 (Set Monotonicity). Let E = (C, V = (v1, . . . , vn)) be an election. If E
∗ =
(C, V ∗) is another election with V ∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n) such that for some j ≤ n we have
vj ∩R(E) = ∅, v∗j = vj ∪R(E) and v∗l = vl for all l 6= j, then R(E∗) = R(E).
All of our rules except First Majority satisfy Set Monotonicity. Let E be an election
with sc(E) = (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1). Then under First Majority we have R(E) = {c1, c2, c3}.
Now if a voter who did not approve {c1, c2, c3} before approves it, then we get sc(E) =
(3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1) and hence R(E) = {c1, c2}.
We can strengthen the axiom if we weaken the assumption that the voter changes
his mind on the winning set to a superset of the winning set.
Axiom 14 (Superset Monotonicity). Let E = (C, V = (v1, . . . , vn)) be an election.
If E∗ = (C, V ∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n)) is another election such that for some j ≤ n we have
vj ∩ R(E) = ∅, v∗j = vj ∪ S where R(E) ⊆ S ⊆ C and v∗l = vl for all l 6= j, then
R(E) = R(E∗).
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Clearly, Superset Monotonicity implies Set Monotonicity, hence First Majority can-
not satisfy Superset Monotonicity. Furthermore f -Threshold, Next-k, Largest Gap and
Size Priority do not satisfy Superset Monotonicity. First, consider an election E with
n = 3 such that sc(E) = (2, 1). Then R(E) = {c1} under f -Threshold. Now, if one
voter changes his mind on {c1, c2}, then R(E) = {c1, c2}. Next, consider an election E
such that sc(E) = (3, 1, 1). Then the winner under Next-k is c1. Now if a voter changes
his mind and additionally approves all three alternatives, then all three alternatives be-
come winners under Next-k (for every k > 1). Now, consider an election E such that
sc(E) = (2, 1, 0). Then R(E) = {c1} under Largest Gap. Now, if one voter changes
his mind on {c1, c2}, then R(E) = {c1, c2}. For Size Priority, consider an election E
such that sc(E) = (2, 1, 1) and 2 B 1 B 3 B 0. Then R(E) = {c1}. Now, if one voter
changes his mind on {c1, c2}, then R(E) = {c1c2}. However, as any ties between winners
remain, Increasing Size Priority satisfies Superset Monotonicity. This is essentially the
only case for which Size Priority satisfies Superset Monotonicity. If an instance of Size
Priority is not increasing then there are k B m and l B m such that k > l and k B l.
We have to additionally assume that 0 is not the most preferred option, in which case
Superset Monotonicity would be vacuously satisfied. Then consider an election E where
l candidates have score 1 and the rest of the candidates has score 0. By assumption,
the l candidates with score 1 are winners under Size Priority with B. Now, if a new
voter approves the l candidates with score 1 and additionally k − l other candidates,
then the k candidates with score 6= 0 are winners under Size Priority with B. Finally,
as the size of the gap between the winners and the non-winners can only increase, First
k-Gap satisfies Superset Monotonicity for all k, which means that also Approval Voting
satisfies Superset Monotonicity.
Set Monotonicity is a very natural axiom for many applications, so the fact that
First Majority does not satisfy it makes it hard to recommend the rule in most situa-
tions. Superset Monotonicity, on the other hand, is less crucial and it depends on the
application if the axiom is desirable.
5 Clustering Algorithms as Shortlisting Methods
Essentially, the goal of shortlisting is to classify some alternatives as most suitable based
on their approval score. The machine learning literature offers a wide variety of clus-
tering algorithms that can perform such a classification. We can turn these algorithms
into shortlisting rules in the following way: Let E = (C, V ). We use sc(E) as input
for a clustering algorithm. This algorithm produces a partition S1, . . . , Sk of sc(E).
We define the winner set to be S ∈ {S1, . . . , Sk} with max(S) = max(sc(E)). Under
the assumption that the algorithm outputs clusters that are non-intersecting intervals
(a condition that any reasonable clustering algorithm satisfies), it is straight-forward
to verify that this procedure indeed defines a shortlisting rule, i.e., this rule satisfies
Anonymity, Neutrality, Efficiency and is non-tiebreaking. In the following, we consider
two types of clustering algorithms: linkage-based algorithms and distance minimization
algorithms.
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Linkage-Based Algorithms
Linkage-based algorithms work in rounds and start with the partition of sc(E) into sin-
gletons. Then, in each round, two sets (clusters) are merged until a stopping criterion
is satisfied. We consider linkage-based algorithms where always the two clusters with
minimum distance are merged. Thus, such algorithms are specified by two features: a
distance metric for sets (to select the next sets to be merged) and a stopping criterion.
We assume that if two or more pairs of sets have the same distance, then the pair con-
taining the smallest element are merged. Following Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [22],
we consider three distance measures: the minimum distance between sets (Single Link-
age), the average distance between sets (Average Linkage), and the maximum distance
between sets (Max Linkage). These three methods can be combined with arbitrary stop-
ping criteria; we consider two: (A) stopping as soon as only two clusters remain, and
(B) stopping as soon as every pair of clusters has a distance of ≥ α.
Interestingly, two of our previously proposed methods correspond to linkage-based
algorithms: First, if we combine the minimum distance with stopping criterion (A) we
obtain the Largest Gap rule. Secondly, if we use the minimum distance and impose a
distance upper-bound of k (stopping criterion B), we obtain the First k-Gap rule. Since
these two rules exhibited favorable properties in our axiomatic analysis, it stands to
reason that other linkage-based rules may be of interest as well. Our analysis reveals
that this is not the case; these four rules do not exhibit a particularly interesting set of
properties. Due to space constraints we have to omit the specifics.
Distance Minimization
Clustering can also be viewed as an optimization problem. Given a partition of sc(E) in
two sets S1, S2, one widely used minimization criteria is the 2-means objective function
Omean. Let µi denote the arithmetic mean of Si. Then
Omean(S1, S2) =
∑
x∈S1
|µ1 − x|2 +
∑
x∈S2
|µ2 − x|2
The corresponding clustering algorithm outputs a partition (S1, S2) that minimizes this
objective function. If two or more partitions have the same minimal objective value, we
choose the partition that yields the smallest winner set.
For general (more-dimensional) distance metrics, this optimization problem is NP-
hard [1, 15]. However, in our case, due to Observation 1, there is only a linear number
of partitions to be considered and we can calculate the objective function in polynomial
time. Therefore this minimization can be done in polynomial time.
From an axiomatic perspective 2-Mean Clustering is not particularly appealing (cf. Ta-
ble 1). It is determined and satisfies Unanimity, Anti-Unanimity and p-Decisiveness
because every shortlisting rule based on a clustering algorithm with a fixed number of
clusters does so. Among the axioms considered in this paper the only additional axiom
that it satisfies is Set Monotonicity. The same negative assessment holds for the closely
related 2-Median Clustering method [22].
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6 Experiments
In numerical experiments we want to evaluate the characteristics of the considered voting
rules for shortlisting tasks. The corresponding Python code is available [19].
Setup
The basic setup is a shortlisting scenario with 100 voters and 30 alternatives. Each
alternative c has an objective quality qc, which is a real number in the [0, 1]. For each
alternative, we generate qc from a truncated normal (Gauss) distribution with mean
0.5 and standard deviation 0.2, restricted to values in [0, 1]. That is, most alternatives
are of average quality (around 0.5) and only few have especially high or low quality.
(Sampling from a uniform distribution yielded comparable results.) Our base assumption
is that voters approve an alternative with likelihood qc. Thus, the approval score of
alternatives are binomially distributed, specifically scE(c) ∼ B(100, qc). We then modify
this assumption to study two complications for shortlisting: noise and bias.
The noise model. This model is controlled by a variable λ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume
that voters do not perfectly perceive the quality of alternatives, but with increasing λ
fail to differentiate between alternatives. Instead of our base assumption that each voter
approves an alternative c with likelihood qc, we change this likelihood to (1−λ)qc+0.5λ.
Thus, for λ = 0 this model coincides with our base assumption; for λ = 1 we have
complete noise, i.e., all alternatives are approved with likelihood 0.5. As λ increases
from 0 to 1, the amount of noise increases, or, in other words, the voters become less
able to judge the quality of alternatives.
The bias model. In this model we assume that a proportion of the voters are biased
against (roughly) half of the alternatives; we call these alternatives disadvantaged. Bi-
ased voters approve these alternatives only with likelihood 0.5 · qc, i.e., they perceive
their quality as only half of their true quality. We assign each alternative with likelihood
0.5 to the set of disadvantaged alternatives. In addition, the alternative with the highest
quality is always disadvantaged.2 We control the amount of bias via a variable γ ∈ [0, 1]:
a subset of voters of size b100 · γc is biased; for the remaining voters our base assumption
applies. As in the noise model, as γ increases from 0 to 1 the shortlisting task becomes
harder as the approval scores less and less reflects the actual quality of alternatives.
Considered voting rules. We ran our experiments on all rules defined in Section 3.
However, we do not mention Next-k, as it returns very large winner sets (average > 25
for any k ≥ 2); we view such large winner sets as undesirable for shortlisting. The same
holds for the 2-Mean Clustering rule (this rule generally just splits the set of alternatives
in half and thus returns the top 15 alternatives). The First k-Gap rule we instantiate
with k = 5 (this corresponds to 5% of the voters). For the Size Priority rule we use the
priority order 4 B 5 B 6 B . . . , i.e., an Increasing Size Priority rule. Finally, we chose
0.5-Threshold as representative for threshold rules.
2 We make this assumption because a bias only against low-quality alternatives is actually helpful
for the shortlisting task—this effect would distort the negative consequences of bias.
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Results
Our comparison of shortlisting rules is visualized in Figure 1 for the noise model (with
varying λ) and in Figure 2 for the noise model (with varying γ). Each data point
(corresponding to a specific λ or γ) is based on N = 1000 instances E1, . . . , EN . Let q
i
c
denote the (objective) quality of alternative c that was used to generate Ei. Both figures
visualize the behaviour of each considered shortlisting rule R via three metrics:
1. average quality of R’s winner sets:
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
c∈R(Ei)
qic,
2. likelihood that the objectively best alternative(s) is/are contained in R’s winner
sets: for q∗i = max{qic : c ∈ C}, this likelihood is
1
N
· ∣∣{i ≤ N : {c ∈ C : qic = q∗i } ⊆ R(Ei)}∣∣ ,
3. average size of R’s winner sets:
1
N
N∑
i=1
|R(Ei)|.
To have a high average quality and to always include the highest-quality alternative
can be viewed as somewhat orthogonal objectives. The first objective is easiest to achieve
by returning small winner sets, the second by returning large winner sets (so that the
objectively best alternative is guaranteed to be included, independently of the voters’
noisy perception). This contrast can be seen clearly when comparing Approval Voting
and 0.5-Threshold : Approval Voting returns rather small winner sets (as seen in Figs. 1c
and 2c) and thus has a high average quality (Figs. 1a and 2a), however if the noise (λ) or
bias (γ) increases, the objectively best alternative is often not contained in the winner
set (Figs. 1b and 2b). 0.5-Threshold has a low average quality (Figs. 1a and 2a) due to
large winner sets (Figs. 1c and 2c), but is likely to contain the objectively best alternative
even for large λ or γ (Figs. 1b and 2b).
Size Priority (with the considered priority order) is a noteworthy alternative to
Approval Voting. It achieves a very similar average quality, while having a significantly
larger chance to include the objectively best alternative. As in shortlisting processes it
is generally not necessary to have very small winner sets, we view Size Priority (with
a sensibly chosen priority order) as superior to Approval Voting. First Majority and
Largest Gap produce rather large winner sets and thus the graphs resemble that of
0.5-Threshold .
Considering the noise model (Fig. 1), we see a very interesting property of First
5-Gap: it is the only rule where the size of winner sets significantly adjusts to increasing
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(a) Average quality of winner sets
(b) Inclusion of objectively best alternative in winner sets
(c) Average size of winner sets
Figure 1: Numerical simulations for the noise model
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noise. If λ increases, the differences between the approval scores vanishes and thus fewer
5-gaps exist. As a consequence, the winner sets increase in size. This is a highly desir-
able behavior, as it allows First 5-Gap to maintain a high likelihood of containing the
objectively best alternative without sacrificing average quality for low-noise instances.
Also First Majority reacts to an increase in noise, albeit to only a very small degree.
This kind of effect can also be observed in the bias model, but to a smaller degree (see
Fig. 2c for γ ∈ [0.1, 0.4]). Note that instantiating First k-Gap with k = 5 is built on the
assumption that there are few unreliable (e.g., biased) voters.
To sum up, our experiments show the behavior of shortlisting rules with accurate
and inaccurate voters, and the trade-off between large and small winner set sizes. In our
opinion, two shortlisting rules have particularly favorable characteristics: 1) Size Priority
produces small, high-quality winner sets but includes more than just the highest-scoring
alternative (as Approval Voting does). Thus, it shows a certain robustness to a noisy
selection process, as is desirable in shortlisting settings. 2) First k-Gap manages to adapt
in high-noise settings by increasing the winner set size, the only rule with this distinct
feature. This makes it particularly recommendable in settings with unclear outcomes
(few or many best alternatives), where a flexible shortlisting method is required.
7 Conclusions
Based on our analysis, we recommend three shortlisting methods: Size Priority , First
k-Gap, and f -Threshold . Size Priority is recommendable if the size of the winner set
is of particular importance, e.g., in highly structured shortlisting processes such as the
nomination for awards. Typically, in such processes, the Multiwinner Approval Voting
rule is used. This rule requires, however, a tiebreaking mechanism. Size Priority does
not break ties (a requirement we impose on shortlisting rules) and thus removes arbitrari-
ness from the shortlisting process. Our numerical experiments show that Size Priority
exhibits a very solid behavior, its axiomatic properties however are less convincing (cf.
Table 1). Our axiomatic analysis reveals First k-Gap as a particularly strong rule. It
satisfies `-Stability and p-Decisiveness (for ` ≤ k, p ≥ k), is resistant to clones and inde-
pendent of losing alternatives. Furthermore, it is the only rule that adapts to increasing
noise in our simulations. A potential disadvantage is that the parameter k has to be
chosen according to the given scenario (number of voters, reliability of voters), which
requires in-depth knowledge about the shortlisting process. Finally, Theorem 4 shows
that f -Threshold rules are the only rules satisfying the Independence axiom. Therefore,
if the selection of alternatives should be independent from each other, then clearly a
f -Threshold rule should be chosen. Note, however, that in many scenarios it is desirable
to compare alternatives with each other.
These recommendations are applicable to most shortlisting scenarios. There are,
however, possible variations of our shortlisting framework that require further analysis
in the future. For example, while strategyproofness is usually not important with inde-
pendent experts, there are some shortlisting applications with a more open electorate
where this may become an issue [7, 21]. In general, the class of variable multiwinner
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(a) Average quality of winner sets
(b) Inclusion of objectively best alternative in winner sets
(c) Average size of winner sets
Figure 2: Numerical simulations for the bias model
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rules (and social dichotomy functions) deserves further attention as many fundamental
questions (concerning proportionality, axiomatic classifications, algorithmic questions,
etc.) are unexplored.
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